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MAY-JUNE, 1962
ONE YEAR REVIEW OF TORTS
By ROBERT B. YEGGE*
The Law must be stable, but it
must not stand still.
Roscoe Pound, Introduction to
the Philosophy of Law (1922)
To satisfy the curious statisticians, there were thirty-three cases
in the tort field decided by the Colorado Supreme Court in 1961.
And if one is really interested in statistical meaninglessness, twenty-
two of the trial court decisions were affirmed, ten were reversed, and
one case was returned to the trial court for a determination of the
issue of damages alone. Of the twenty-two cases affirmed, fifteen
were judgments for the plaintiff. Of the ten cases reversed, seven
of the lower court judgments were rendered in favor of the defend-
ant. The case remanded on the issue of damages alone was, obvi-
ously, a verdict for the plaintiff.
I. CLEAR PRINCIPLES REAFFIRMED
The bar was heartened by the fundamental reassertion of the
purpose of the law of torts in Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Horn Tower Constr. Co.' The telephone company brought an action
against a subcontractor to recover on the theory of trespass for sev-
erance of an underground conduit. The jury rendered a verdict for
defendant, and plaintiff sued out writ of error, urging that absolute
liability for damage as a result of trespass to the personal property
of plaintiff was involved and that the issue of absolute liability
should have been submitted to the jury, not merely the issue of
negligence. The court defined trespass to chattels as "the intentional
interference with the possession or physical condition of a chattel
in possession of another without justification." Thereafter, the court
re-established sound but fundamental tort law in two respects:
(1) The court, through Mr. Justice Doyle, discarded plaintiff's
argument that: It is not necessary that the defendant shall have
acted maliciously toward the plaintiff's property; it is sufficient if
defendant intentionally did the act which resulted in the damage.
Instead, the court stated: "The alleged wrongdoer must have in-
tended the result, or must have acted wantonly or at least negli-
gently. Unintentional non-negligent interferences with chattels is
not actionable."2 The court exemplified by saying: "The driving of
an automobile in heavy traffic will not subject the driver to a claim
in trespass by one whose car is struck. In this latter case liability
would have to depend on proof of negligence.
'
3
(2) "The doctrine of this case has been universally accepted
and applied and has been the basis for the fundamental principle
of the law of negligence and its corollary, the law of wantonness,
that fault of the action is an essential ingredient of liability."'
*Partner in the Denver firm of Yegge, Hall & Shulenburg and Instructor in Law, University of
Denver Law Center.
1 363 P.2d 175 (Colo. 1961).





Additional sound law in bailments was announced in Bankers
Warehouse Co. v. Bennett.5 Defendant was bailee of certain nut
meats. There was evidence that the nut meats were received by the
defendant in good marketable condition. When the nuts were with-
drawn from the warehouse by the plaintiff, they were contaminated
and unusable for the purpose intended-the nuts being impregnated
with the odor of moth balls. The plaintiff offered no testimony of
specific acts of negligence on the part of the defendant bailee. The
court stated: "Under the law applicable to such a situation, a pre-
sumption of negligence on the part of the bailee at once arises, and
the burden of going forward with evidence to overcome this pre-
sumption rests on the defendant.. .. Here it was incumbent upon
the defendant to show that the nut meats were not contaminated
by reason of its negligence. This it failed to do."6 Judgment for the
plaintiff in the trial court was affirmed. It is good to see that the
law remains stable.
II. THE PRICE OF MENTAL ANGUISH
Some established principles of law were constantly reaffirmed
by the court in 1961. Denial of recovery for mental anguish unac-
companied by physical injury was not an exception to this desir-
able consistency.
In Valley Development Co. v. Weeks,7 plaintiff sought damages,
and other relief, as owner of a water and ditch right which supplied
her lands with irrigation water, resulting from defendant's reloca-
tion of the ditch. The court held that plaintiff had a vested right in
the ditch which was protected from defendant's interference, and
that an action in tort would lie for any such interference. However,
the supreme court reversed that part of the judgment entered in
compensation for mental anguish suffered in connection with the
interference. The court said:
Without detailing at length various opinions in the above
citations, suffice it to say that under ordinary circumstances
there can be no recovery in tort for mental anguish suf-
fered by a plaintiff in connection with an injury to his
property, either real or personal. Where, however, the act
occasioning the damage to property was inspired by fraud,
malice, or other such motives, mental suffering is often held
to be a proper element of damage."
The supreme court refers to the fact that the trial court found no
willful and wanton conduct on the .part of defendant. On the basis
of this finding, the supreme court found error in the trial court's
award of damages, in any amount, for mental pain and suffering.
In Grant v. Gwyn,9 defendant in the lower court inserted a
counterclaim asking damage to her person and business reputation
and for having suffered shock and mental distress as a result of
alleged disturbances and annoyances occasioned by the plaintiff.
The trial court dismissed the claim and the supreme court right-
fully affirmed the dismissal saying:
5 365 P.2d 889 (Colo. 1961).
6 Id. at 891.
7 364 P.2d 730 (Colo. 1961).
8 Id. at 733.
9 365 P.2d 256 (Colo. 1961).
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In essence, it is a claim for damages arising from alleged
emotional disturbance resulting from alleged threats and"annoying" conduct attributed to Gwyn which caused
"mental distress" in the mind of Grant, over a period of
time (not specified), prior to the incident of March 21, 1956,
which forms the basis of Gwyn's complaint. Counsel for
Grant has cited no case which holds that damages for such
an emotional disturbance can be adjudicated. 10
III. ANIMALS AND ORDINANCES
Animals were considered with some frequency this year. In
Swerdfeger v. Krueger," an eleven year old boy entered the de-
fendant's unfenced yard where the defendant's Malemute Husky
was securely chained to a dog house. Before entering the yard, the
boy's companions warned him that the dog had vicious propensities.
Nevertheless, the boy entered the yard and, as expected, was bitten.
Suit was instituted by the mother for injury to the minor. It was
urged that according to established Colorado authority absolute
liability is imposed on an owner of a dog known to be vicious. 2
The court dismissed this contention as not supported in Colorado
law. Further the court found, as dictum, that contributory negli-
gence could form the basis of defense in a case of this nature. In
reversing a judgment for the minor and dismissing the case, the
supreme court states that the minor "deliberately put himself in
harm's way with full knowledge and understanding of what his
companions had told him about the dog."' 13 According to the Restate-
ment of the Law of Torts, such circumstances absolve a dog owner
of liability to a trespassing child. Two dissents raise the question of
contributory negligence of an eleven year old, and the soundness
of the Restatement principle with respect to technical trespasses by
children and the variable standard between children and between
children and adults. It appears that children must still be taught
that vicious dogs bite.
An early 1961 case announced some sound law with respect to
statutory construction and provided some subtle humor. In Moore
v. Fletcher,14 we find two disgruntled (for whatever reason) hunt-
ers suing a fellow hunter for injuries sustained from the muzzle of
a .22 rifle. The plaintiffs arrived at defendant's land in the darkness
of early morning. There, without permission of the defendant, they
dug their goose pit. Little known to them, the defendant was in a
similar blind nearby. As dawn broke, the defendant noticed plain-
tiff's decoys and shot into them. One shot hit one plaintiff. A second
shot hit another plaintiff. The court found that the plaintiffs were
trespassers and that defendant did not know of the plaintiffs' pres-
ence until after the shots were fired. The trial court entered judg-
ment of dismissal on these facts. Our supreme court affirmed the
judgment asserting that defendant, a lessee in possession, breached
no duty to plaintiffs in that he owed only the duty to have his prem-
ises in a reasonably safe condition and to give warning of latent or
concealed defects. No additional duty was owed since defendant was
10 Id. at 259.
11 358 P.2d 479 (Colo. 1961).
12 Yegge, Dog's Bill of Rights, 34 DICTA 178 (1957).
13 Swerdfeger v. Krueger, supro note I1, at 482.
14 363 'P.2d 1056 (Colo. 1961).
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not aware of the presence of the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs urged that vio-
lation of Colo. Rev. Stat. 62-12-3 (1953), regarding use of a rifle or
pistol to hunt, kill, or scare migratory waterfowl, was negligence
per se. Mr. Justice McWilliams pointed out that the statute was
enacted to protect waterfowl, not poachers. The statute could not
establish negligence per se when it was not enacted to protect the
interests of the class of which the plaintiffs were members. The
law does not protect migratory goose hunters without "licenses."
The court twice again considered the effect of violation of a
statute or ordinance as establishing negligence, absent proof. Colo-
rado, in 1961, did not look with favor upon the attempted establish-
ment of fault without proof of negligence. In Piper v. Mayer,15 the
trial court instructed the jury as to numerous statutory provisions,
pertaining to parking and required lights on the highway, in a case
wherein the plaintiff's vehicle struck a parked and disabled vehicle
on an icy highway. The trial court instructed the jury that if it
found that any of the provisions of the statutes had been violated
and the violation was the proximate cause of the injury, said viola-
tion constituted negligence per se. The court, in evaluating the evi-
dence, pointed to facts showing independent cause of the accident
and concluded: "In the light of these factors, it is impossible, in
the present state of the record, to find evidence suggesting that
statutory violations by the defendants constituted the proximate
cause of the collision."' 6
In a distinctly worded opinion by Mr. Justice Moore, a 1961
case 17 established that violation of a city ordinance, which violation
was not proximately connected with the damage, could not in itself
form the basis for plaintiff's recovery. The plaintiff argued, as the
sole ground for charging the defendant with responsibility for the
accident, that the defendant's violation of an ordinance disallowing
persons from leaving running motor vehicles unattended, was negli-
gence per se. Plaintiff contended that this violation was the proxi-
mate cause of the accident involving a vehicle owned by defendant
and operated by a thief. The court stated that violation of an ordi-
nance adopted for the safety of the public may be negligence per se,
but it is nevertheless essential to recovery of damages based upon
such violations to establish that it was the proximate cause of the
15 360 P.2d 433 (Colo. 1961).
16 Id. at 437.
1- Lambotte v. Payton, 363 P.2d 167 (Colo. 1961).
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injury complained of. "The violation of a statute or ordinance en-
acted for the protection of persons or property does not ipso facto
import liability unless the violation be shown by proper proof to
be the proximate cause of the injury.""8
Animals and statutes found their common ground in State v.
Morison.19 Plaintiffs, upon legislation allowing suit against the
agents of the sovereign, sought to recover for loss of their herd of
cattle after the herd had been infected with paratuberculosis.
Plaintiffs alleged that a neighbor's herd of cattle showed symptoms
of paratuberculosis and that such was called to the attention of the
state veterinarian who refused to act to prevent the spread of the
contagious and infectious disease. To assist in establishing negli-
gence on the state veterinarian's part, the plaintiff contended that
the state veterinarian breached certain duties thrust upon him by
statute and that the violation of these statutory duties constituted
negligence. The statute imposes a duty on the State Agricultural
Commission to take steps that will prevent the spread of disease
within the state. Mr. Justice McWilliams, in a well reasoned opinion,
found that the statute in question was designed to protect not only
the general public, but also a class of persons of which the plaintiffs
were members. Accordingly, the plaintiffs could properly rely on
the statute to show defendant's negligence.
IV. FRAUD: TRADITIONAL AND AGGRAVATED
Fraud with respect to real property thrice faced the Colorado
Supreme Court in 1961. Fraud cases covered cheating the aged,
over-puffing the property intended for sale, and inflating the in-
come potential of rental property.
Poor old Dr. Hinshaw met his match in Cora Marie Hook.
20
The well-to-do eighty year old man married the younger woman,
after which time she would not live with him until he conveyed
two valuable pieces of real estate to her for only nominal consid-
eration. The executor of Dr. Hinshaw's estate brought suit against
Cora Marie to cancel the two deeds. The trial court dismissed the
suit on the ground that no fraud was established. The supreme court
stated: "It is true, as the defendants urge, that the burden of proof
to establish fraud and undue influence is upon him who asserts it,
and that it must be established by clear and satisfactory evidence.
However, we have held that fraud in some situations may be pre-
sumed from the relationship, or from the circumstances and condi-
tions of the contracting parties."' The court reversed the judgment
of dismissal, finding that the record disclosed a substantial inequa-
lity between the parties and thus, the burden shifted to the former
wife to prove that the transactions were in fact fair, just and rea-
sonable and not fraudulent. Often, the law does not look out for
those who look out for themselves.
Corder v. Laws22 affirmed a judgment in favor of a vendee
against a vendor. The vendor represented to the vendee that the
second floor of the premises, which were later purchased, were be-
ing rented for $200 a month on a five year lease. Leases substantiat-
18 Id. at 168.
19 365 P.2d 266 (Colo. 1961).
20 Hinshaw v. Hinshaw, 365 P.2d 815 (Colo. 1961)
21 Id. at 817.
22 366 P.2d 369 (Colo. 1961).
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ing such representation were shown to vendee. However, the vendor
failed to reveal that he had a private understanding with the tenant
that the tenant need not pay rent for the first six months of the
tenancy, and the vendor did not reveal that the tenant did not
intend to live up to the terms of the lease. As a result of the failure
to reveal the true relationship between the vendor and the tenant,
the court affirmed a judgment for damages against vendor based
upon fraud.
Lastly, Denver Business Sales Co. v. Lewis2 3 considered the
representation of a seller of real property that "the house was built
and constructed of the very finest material and workmanship; that
it was constructed in such manner that it was and would be trouble
free, and was ready for the plaintiff to occupy over a long period
of time. '24 In fact, there were some geological problems with the
soil on which the house was built, which it was alleged were not
properly provided for in the construction period. Objection was
taken to the instruction given on fraud which included that "the
sellers failed to disclose a matter which in the exercise of reasonable
care they should have known." The court stated: "The inclusion
of this language in the instruction was error. In an action based on
fraud, which generally involves a corrupt motive, one cannot be
held liable for concealing a condition concerning which he had no
knowledge. 2-5 The court pointed out that the applicability of exer-
cise of reasonable prudence with respect to acts in negligence cases
has no application to cases based on fraud and deceit. Hear no evil,
speak no evil, see no evil.
V. WHEN NEGLIGENT CONDUCT Is NOT NEGLIGENCE
The question of health as it affects the capacity to commit a
negligent act was twice discussed by the Colorado Supreme Court.
Renell v. Argonaut Liquor Co.20 concerned a rear-end accident.
The attack by the plaintiff was twofold: negligence of the employee
in operation of a motor vehicle, and negligence of the employer
who knew or reasonably should have known that the defendant was
too drowsy, overworked and fatigued to drive an automobile on the
public highway. The jury returned a verdict for defendants, driver
and employer. First, the court established that if in fact the defend-
ant "blacked out" or "fainted" under circumstances not foreseen
by him, he would not be answerable as negligent for events which
occurred while he was blacked out or in a faint. Second, the jury's
findings with regard to the fainting and with regard to the em-
ployer's alleged neglect would not be disturbed under the circum-
stances of the record.
Johnson v. Lambotte27 considered the question of whether a
person who is mentally incompetent can be held liable for tortious
conduct. Affirming a judgment against a defendant who was under
treatment for chronic schizophrenia, but had not been adjudicated
mentally incompetent, the court cited with approval Corpus Juris
Secundum, Insane Persons, section 122, which concludes that an
insane person may be liable for his tort, the same as a sane person.
23 365 P.2d 895 (Colo. 1961).
24 Id. at 896.
25 Id. at 898.
26365 P.2d 239 (Colo. 1961).
27 363 P.2d 165 (Colo. 1961).
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except perhaps those in which malice and intention are a necessary
ingredient.
VI. WHEN No CONDUCT Is NEGLIGENCE
Another insight into the law regarding imputation of negligence
from driver to passenger was gained in Lasnetske v. Parres.2 8 Negli-
gence was imputed from the driver to the passenger inasmuch as
both driver and passenger contributed their respective earnings to
the maintenance of the household; the automobile was jointly
owned by them; and the accident occurred as the two were driving
home from work. An additional fact was present, however: The
passenger did not have a driver's license and did not know how to
operate an automobile. The Colorado court affirmed its prior hold-
ing that joint ownership, occupancy, possession and use in a joint
mission presumes an agency.29 In addition, it rejected the signifi-
cance of the inability of the passenger to drive, authority of other
jurisdictions to the contrary notwithstanding. It is hard to say
whether the law remains stable.
VII. UNDAMAGED: RES IPSA LOQUITUR
Res ipsa loquitur again found its way to the Colorado Supreme
Court for interpretation in 1961. The court treated the fiction wi'h
care by strictly applying its tenets in conjunction with other well
established and reaffirmed torts principles.
In McGee v. Heim,3 0 plaintiffs, owners of real property, sued
their tenant for damage occasioned by fire which took place in the
rented premises. Plaintiff relied upon the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-
tur. The court reaffirmed the principle that, under usual circum-
stances, the mere happening of a fire, or the happening of an acci-
dent, under mysterious circumstances, cannot alone call the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur into play. In holding that the doctrine did not
apply in the present case, the court stated: "When it can, with equal
reasonableness, as here, be inferred that the accident in question
was due to a cause other than the alleged negligence of the defend-
ant, res ipsa loquitur may not be invoked against such a defend-
ant.
3 1
The plaintiff in Flader v. Simonsen3 2 attempted, for the first
time in the supreme court, to argue that injury sustained by a pas-
:S 365 P.2d 250 (Colo. 1961).
29 Moore v. Skiles, 13) Colo. 191, 274 P.2d 311 (1954).
20 362 P.2d 193 (Colo. 1961).
31 Id. at 196.






senger in a private aircraft invoked the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
The court rejected the argument as too late, as not urged in the
trial court and as inconsistent with proof of negligence offered in
the trial court. However, the court affirmed the trial court in find-
ing that the facts were such as not to warrant invoking the doctrine.
Worthy of speculation is the disposition of the seven justices
when the doctrine is timely urged in an accident of this kind. With
the increased use of aircraft for everyday transportation, the issue
will doubtless be resolved soon. Does the law remain stable, or do
the artifacts of modern technology demand different rules?
VIII. RISKS AND GUESTS: CONTRIBUTORY AND ASSUMPTIVE
The year 1961 saw an interesting admixture of contributory
negligence compounded with assumption of risk to which was added
a dash of the guest statute.
With respect to contributory negligence, Stevens v. Strauss
33
reaffirms a well known principle saying: "No obligation rests upon
a plaintiff to negative contributory negligence. Contributory negli-
gence is not presumed. While the proof offered by the plaintiff may
establish contributory negligence, unless it so appears, such negli-
gence is an affirmative defense, and the burden of proving it rests
upon the defendant. '34 Such statement was made in rejecting the
defendant's assignment of error that the plaintiff failed to plead
and prove freedom from contributory negligence.
In Farmer v. McColm, 35 plaintiff was riding a motor scooter
on a street which was snow-packed and icy, cut off his throttle and
tipped over, after which he was struck by an oncoming motor vehi-
cle. It was resolved in the trial court by a directed verdict for the
defendant on the ground that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence
as a matter of law. The supreme court, in reversing the directed
verdict, stated that the evidence was sufficient to make the issue of
contributory negligence a disputed one of fact properly to be re-
solved by the jury, and under the circumstances should not have
been resolved by the trial court as a matter of law. "Intelligent jur-
ors might well differ in their opinion as to whether under all the
circumstances plaintiff was negligent in the manner in which he
attempted to stop his motor scooter when confronted with what he
deemed was an emergency situation. '3
6
Radetsky v. Leonard37 established: "It is not necessarily negli-
gence for a pedestrian to be a short distance outside of a crosswalk
if such does not lead to resulting injury. '38 This determination was
made by the supreme court in reversing a judgment for the defend-
ant in a case .wherein the defendant made a left turn and hit the
pedestrian outside of the crosswalk. The supreme court stated that
there was error in submitting the question of contributory negli-
gence to the jury. The trial court should have directed a verdict for
the plaintiff, where the sole defense appeared to be that the plain-
tiff was outside the crosswalk.
33 364 P.2d 382 (Colo. 1961).
34 Id. at 384.
35 364 P.2d 1059 (Colo. 1961).
36 Id. at 1061.
37 358 P.2d 1014 (Colo. 1961).
38 Id. at 1016.
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Assumption of risk, somewhat confused with contributory. negli-
gence, seemed to mix well with beer in 1961. In Appelhans v. Kirk-
wood,3 9 a fourteen year old plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle
driven by defendant which collided with a post on the Valley High-
way. Both plaintiff and minor defendant had been drinking beer
prior to the accident. After entry of judgment for the plaintiff,
defendant sought reversal on the ground that as a matter of law the
plaintiff had assumed the risk of injury. In denying the defendant's
contention, the court said: "Plaintiff's age and mental immaturity
were matters to be considered by the jury in measuring the extent
of the plaintiff's knowlege of automobiles and alcohol, and were for
the jury to weigh and consider in determining whether there was
a voluntary assumption of risk with full knowledge of the hazards
threatened.
40
In Pletchas v. Von Poppenheim,41 a passenger sued the driver
of an automobile for injuries when the automobile skidded over and
down the bank of a mountain highway. The defendant driver had
been drinking beer and his driving ability was impaired. Again it
was urged, after entry of judgment for the plaintiff, that a verdict
should have been directed for the defendant upon the evidence of
drinking by the defendant driver which would establish assumption
of risk as a matter of law. The court did not agree. The trial court
properly submitted the case to the jury, leaving to the jury the
factual issue of proximate cause of the accident. It seems that the
amount of beer consumed was a disputed issue of fact. Whether
fact or law, the court considered that the extent to which the con-
sumption of beer affected the driver's operation of the vehicle was
a question for the jury.
Both the Appelhans and Pletchas cases considered the applica-
bility of the guest statute, at least indirectly. Appelhans states that
the cause was submitted to the jury, pursuant to the guest statute,
when apparently no question of the guest statute was raised. Plet-
chas affirmed the trial court's holding that the guest statute was
inapplicable to the case, inasmuch as custom among professional
wrestlers (both plaintiff and defendant being professional wrest-
lers) was for a passenger (plaintiff) to pay the driver (defendant)
on a mileage basis at the end of the trip. Hence, the defendant was
a carrier for hire; the guest statute did not apply by its own terms.
IX. Is AN ACCIDENT EVER UNAVOIDABLE?
As one might expect, the apparent mythological legal principle
of "Unavoidable Accident" was raised in Piper v. Mayer.42 There, in
a case for personal injuries resulting from an automobile accident,
the defendants' vehicle spun out of control on an icy highway and
hit the rear of the plaintiff's stalled and parked car. The trial court
submitted to the jury the question of unavoidable accident, and the
jury returned a verdict for the defendants. The supreme court re-
versed, stating that the unavoidable accident instruction was error;
observing that there was evidence the defendants were driving at
an unreasonable rate of speed in view of the road conditions; and
39 365 P.2d 233 (Colo. 1961).
40 Id. at 237.
41 365 P.2d 261 (Colo. 1961).
42360 P.2d 433 (Colo. 1961).
DICTA
MAY-JUNE, 1962
holding "the jury should have been permitted to resolve this con-
flict free of the confusion resulting from submission of a theory of
law leading to the conclusion that plaintiffs might not be permitted
to recover irrespective of the negligence or non-negligence of the
defendants."
43
Query: Is there such a thing as a doctrine of "Unavoidable
Accident"?
X. THE VARIOUS DUTIES TO PROTECT INVITEES
The duty owed business invitees was four times considered. The
matter of proof of negligence was considered in Remley v. New-
ton.4" A child guest at a resort was found lying unconscious on the
ground near a tether ball pole which was not anchored to the
ground, but merely held upright by an iron wheel. The court af-
firmed the principle that proof of the happening of an accident or
occurrence of injury alone raises no inference of negligence. The
court went on to say that negligence may be established by facts
and circumstances surrounding the accident. Toward that end the
claimant had offered the testimony of an employee of the school
district whose job it was to install and maintain playground equip-
ment, including tether ball equipment. The testimony was proffered
to the issue that there was a safe way to install such equipment so
that a child would not get hurt and so that there would be no dan-
ger of the pole toppling. It is inferred from the opinion that the
proffered testimony would establish that the equipment was not
properly installed by the defendant. The trial court had excluded
such evidence. In reversing this order, the supreme court cited Re-
statement of the Law of Torts, section 343, and concluded: "If, as
contended by counsel for plaintiff, there is a safe and proper way
to install tether ball equipment which is uniformly maintained on
children's playgrounds, we see no reason why testimony establish-
ing that fact should be excluded. '45 The court rejected the argument
that there is a distinction between a playground at a school and a
playground at a vacation resort in allowing the "expert" testimony
of a man familiar with school equipment, and not familiar with
resort equipment.
In a somewhat different conclusion, Blackburn v. Tombling
46
considered the propriety of a judgment against a hotel operator for
injuries sustained by a plaintiff who fell on the hotel steps. When
cne of the outer doors of the hotel was opened it extended about 20
inches beyond the outer side of a step down to the sidewalk level.
The plaintiff suffered the injury while leaving the hotel through
this door. The trial court allowed the plaintiff to call a so-called
expert witness to testify that defendant's doorway constituted a
dangerous condition. The expert was an architect who had long
practiced in the community of the hotel, and had constructed many
hotels. The witness testified, as an expert, that it was his opinion
that the doorway condition was dangerous. In this case the court
held that the expert's testimony was not admissible. The court
reaffirms the age old principle: "There is no need for expert opinion
43 Id. at 436.
44 3,4 P.2d 581 (Colo. 1961).
45 Id. at 583.
46 365 P.2d 243 (Colo. 1961).
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with reference to facts involving commonplace occurences." Sound-
ly, the court also found error in admission of evidence that other
persons had fallen or stumbled over the doorway in question prior
to the time of the plaintiff's accident, saying: "Plaintiff made no
attempt to establish any similarity of the circumstances of the iso-
lated events and the accident in question. There was no showing
whether such prior incidents occurred while persons were entering
or leaving the hotel; whether they occurred in the daytime or at
night, or whether they were in any way similar to the accident in
question. '47 There is no mention of the duty of care imposed on a
hotel operator in the opinion.
For children and tether balls, experts on proper construction
are competent to testify; for adult hotel guests, experts on proper
construction are not competent.
Nettrour v. J. C. Penney Co. 48 at last establishes a duty owed
to an invitee by the owner of property. In this case, a five year old
boy was injured while riding an escalator in defendant's depart-
ment store. Upon the following evidence, the trial court granted a
directed verdict to the defendant: The escalator started and stopped
in a jerking sort of way, the child's mother's attention was mis-
directed, and soon she heard her child calling, after which she saw
that the child had fallen and his right index finger was engaged
between the moving step and the side wall of the escalator. The
mother vainly attempted to have the escalator stopped and finally
47 Id. at 245.
48 360 P.2d 964 (Colo. 1961).
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she disengaged the child's finger. Evidence disclosed that the emer-
gency stop button on the escalator was located at such a place that
there was no warning or directional sign near it. The court im-
pliedly rejected the argument that the defendant was functioning
as a common carrier and cited Corpus Juris Secundum for the gen-
eral rule that the owner of property owes to an invitee or business
visitor the duty of exercising reasonable or ordinary care for safety
commensurate with the particular circumstances involved. Never-
theless, on the particular facts, the supreme court reversed the di-
rected verdict for defendant, holding that the case should have been
submitted to the jury, there being present issues upon which rea-
sonable minds might differ. Apparently, although it is not clear,
the difference would be on the interpretation of an ordinance re-
quiring emergency stop buttons.
Another case involving the liability of hotel owners was Sniezek
v. Cimino,4 9 setting forth a test for duty of care owed an invitee.
A neon sign repairman, in repairing the hotel owner's neon sign,
was electrocuted as a result of a stray wire in the area of repairs.
The trial court directed a verdict for the hotel owner, to which the
claimant took exception. First, the supreme court held that the
repairman, who was an employee of the neon sign company, was
an invitee, as to the hotel owner. Second, in affirming the directed
verdict, the court set forth the duty of the hotel owner as applied
to the facts of the case, saying: "Such owner can only be held re-
sponsible for those hazards about which he knows or should have,
as a prudent man, discovered. In the case at bar, had the roof been
accessible to the Blairs [owners] and had they made an investiga-
tion, it would not have altered the situation since their knowledge
is not shown to have been sufficient to detect the danger or warn
the decedent or his employer of the hazard."5 0
Regularly used escalators and five year olds are certain circum-
stances which raise factual issues of safety; uninvestigated, unde-
tected dangers and adult repairmen are certain circumstances which
do not raise factual issues of safety. Department stores and hotel
owners are prudent men who should detect knowledgeable dangers.
XI. MALPRACTICE OF TRADESMEN
Surprise! There were no medical malpractice cases in 1961 be-
fore the Colorado Supreme Court. However, the malpractice of oc-
cupations less traditionally known as professional did concern the
Colorado court.
Plumbers' malpractice was twice the subject of litigation reach-
ing the Supreme Court of Colorado in 1961. Lembke Plumbing and
Heating was sued by a homeowner as a result of damage for failure
to protect a pipe in a concrete wall and for damage occasioned by
a broken tube while the plumbing firm's employee was performing
repair work at a later date.51 In defense, Lembke urged contributory
negligence because the plaintiff failed to have soil tests made which,
the defendants urged, would have shown water in such amount as
to expand the clay, such expansion causing the damage. The court
49 360 P.2d 813 (Colo. 1961).
50 Id. at 815.
51 Lenbke Plumbing & Heating v. Hayutin, 366 P.2d 673 (Colo. 1961).
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found that the evidence did not show an abnormal water content in
the soil, and further stated: "Hayutins [plaintiffs] were not bound
at the time of construction or prior thereto to anticipate defective
plumbing and leakage and to make provision therefor. ' '52 Defendant
further urged that a printed form contract signed by the plaintiff
precluded recovery by the recital that the contract "lawfully expires
one year from date." The court held that the contract does not pro-
vide a substitute statute of limitations for acts of negligence in the
absence of an express provision therefor and again reaffirmed the
principle that contracts limiting liability are strictly construed.
Upon review it was found that the finding of negligence in the low-
er court was justified and the trial court's judgment for the plain-
tiff was affirmed.
In Larrick v. Burt Chevrolet, Inc.,53 the automobile dealer had
engaged Larrick to build an addition to. its body shop. Larrick em-
ployed a plumber to relocate steam pipes connected with the heating
plant. The plumber, acting under instructions from the general con-
tractor, shut off the gas boiler, drained the same, relocated the pipe,
filled the boiler again with water and then undertook to light the
gas burner. It was found that the boiler was dry and extensive
damage was suffered as a result of dry-firing. In the suit, the plumb-
er cross-claimed against the general contractor for indemnity. In
affirming a judgment against the plumber and the general contrac-
52 Id. at 677.
53 362 P.2d 1030 (Colo. 1961).
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tor, the court observed that the plumber was wholly unqualified
to do the job he undertook and it was due to his lack of qualifica-
tions, ineptitude and negligence that caused the boiler to be dry-
fired and damaged. Furthermore, it was found that the general con-
tractor and plumber were joint tort feasors and, therefore, there
was no right of indemnity.
XII. A MISCELLANY ON PROOF
Contaminated food was the subject of litigation in Gonzales v.
Safeway Stores, Inc.5 4 Plaintiff, in preparing dinner, opened a can
of peas, poured them into a clean saucepan, warmed them and
served them to her husband and herself. While eating the peas,
the plaintiffs, husband and wife, discovered a bug in the peas. Al-
leged injury followed. The trial court granted the defendant's mo-
tion to dismiss. In the supreme court the case was reversed. The
court reaffirmed the implied warranty of fitness in food and re-
jected the trial court's resolution of "a case of equal probability."
The trial court apparently took the view that through inadvertence
the bug got into the food while being prepared in the plaintiffs'
kitchen. The supreme court stated that where evidence concerning
material facts is such that reasonable minds could differ, a case
should be submitted to the jury and the court's refusal to do so was
error.
An interesting review of acts of a private airplane pilot which
do not constitute negligence with respect to a non-paying passenger
in such aircraft are discussed in Flader v. Simonsen.55 In the case,
judgment was entered for the plaintiff in the trial court for negli-
gence, allegedly in the defendant's failing to use due care with
respect to operation of the airplane. In a lengthy discussion of the
facts, the supreme court reversed the trial court's finding and dis-
missed the complaint.
Although this article does not review damages, it is significant
to note that an award of $7,676.96 to a father and $12,500 to a moth-
er, both of whom had a life expectancy of 20 years, for wrongful
death of their well educated, well trained daughter, who was a
senior at Colorado University at the time of the accident, was not
excessive in the case of Stevens v. Strauss.56 In Thompson v. Gu-
rule, 5 7 the court held that an award of $250 to a mother and $100 to
a minor daughter for bruises, abrasion and shock sustained when
they were thrown about in an automobile was not excessive.
Numerous cases were decided with respect to proof necessary
to sustain a jury verdict and the propriety of submitting questions
to a jury.58
54 363 P.2d 667 (Colo. 1961).
55 366 P.2d 678 (Colo. 1961).
56 364 P.2d 382 (Colo. 1961).
57 360 P.2d 679 (Colo. 1961).
58 Frank v. Whinery, 366 P.2d 560 (Colo. 1961) (whether plaintiff stopped for a red light, whether
orthopedic devices interfered with her ability to drive ond whether defendant gave turn signal);
Smith v. Eichheim, 363 P.2d 185 (Colo. 1961) (whether loss of former's wheat crops were proximate-
ly caused by operation of neighbor's harvesting equipment); Chicago Rock Island & Pac. R.R. v.
Williams, 367 P.2d 342 (Colo. 1961) (whether railroad was negligent in grade crossing collision);
Lasnetske v. Parres, 365 P.2d 250 (Colo. 1961) (whether left turning motorist or oncoming 'motorist
in the intersection automobile collision was negligent or contributorily negligent); Thompson v. Gu-
rule, 360 P.2d 679 (Colo. 1961) (whether defendant was negligent in driving his automobile with.
out its headlights); Bobo v. Logan, 358 P.2d 889 (Colo. 1961) (whether evidence was sufficient to
establish wilful and wanton acts which would take the case from under the protection of the guest
statute).
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